

**Provisional Translation**

**Research Report on  
Foreign Affairs and National Security  
(Interim Report)  
(Excerpt)**

**June 2023**

**Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security**

**House of Councillors**

**The National Diet of Japan**



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## **Foreword**

Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has exposed confrontation among states with different values and different political systems. In addition, we have entered an extremely complex era in which the growing presence of emerging countries and developing countries, known as the Global South, is causing a major shake-up in the existing international order.

Concerning the war in Ukraine, the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons has increased following its threats to use nuclear and its moves to suspend implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), an arms control and disarmament treaty between the US and Russia. The use of anti-personnel landmines, cluster bombs and other inhumane weapons has also been confirmed despite the existence of treaties banning them. In addition, the stagnation of Ukrainian grain exports and the significant reduction in Russian natural gas supplies have caused a global food and energy crisis, which is having a serious impact on countries, destabilizing political and regional situations, and directly affecting human security.

Furthermore, amid growing tension between China and its neighboring countries over the East China Sea and South China Sea and the unprecedented frequency of repeated missile launches by North Korea, the developments in the war in Ukraine are also a major cause for concern for the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this context, the inability of the United Nations (UN) to take adequate measures in response to the war in Ukraine—in which Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, is one of the countries involved in the conflict—throws into sharp relief the limitations and need for reform in achieving the UN's mission of maintaining international peace and security, while cooperation among like-minded countries, such as NATO and AUKUS, and bilateral cooperation, such as the Japan-U.S. Alliance, are gathering momentum.

Resolving today's problems of war and peace requires a multilayered response that

combines bilateral and multilateral frameworks as well as those among like-minded countries in various aspects, including political, economic, and military. Recognizing the importance of reviving multilateralism, such as the UN, in building a new international order, the Committee decided on “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” as the research theme for this three-year term with a view to taking up a broad range of specific issues related to foreign affairs and national security, examining these issues in a comprehensive manner, and exploring ways of resolving problems of war and peace.

## **I. Research Process**

Research committees in the House of Councillors are a unique feature of the House of Councillors. Taking note of the fact that the House of Councillors is not dissolved and that members serve six-year terms, research committees are established for the purpose of conducting long-term, comprehensive research relating to fundamental matters of government over a period of three years. At the 210th Diet session (extraordinary session) on October 3, 2022, the Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security was established for the purpose of conducting long-term, comprehensive research on foreign affairs and national security.

The Committee decided that the research theme for this three-year term would be “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order,” and at the 211th Diet session (ordinary session), in starting the three-year research, it began by hearing the opinions of three voluntary testifiers and discussing with them the “Requirements for the Prevention of War” (February 8, 2023). The Committee then held meetings on the following subjects: Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START), Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.), UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies), and Developing Sustainable Defense Bases (February 15 and 22 and April 12 and 26, 2023). Each time, the Committee heard the opinions of three voluntary testifiers and asked them questions. Finally, the Committee members exchanged views with each other on the theme “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” (May 17, 2023).

## **II. Research Outline**

### **1. Requirements for the Prevention of War (February 8, 2023)**

In his classic treatise about war entitled “Vom Kriege” [On War], author Carl von Clausewitz presents the view that the essence of war is nothing more than a continuation of policy by other means. Although this phrase captures one aspect of war, in today’s international society, following the ravages of two world wars, war has been outlawed. Nevertheless, in recent years, amid moves by some countries to unilaterally change the status quo by force as the balance of power in the international community shifts, preventing and resolving the outbreak of war in the 21st century has become a pressing issue.

In February 2022, Russia launched an aggression against Ukraine in clear violation of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force. In the face of a situation unforeseen by the Charter—namely, a permanent member, with veto power, of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security committing acts that breach international peace—the international community has taken various measures, including adopting a resolution of condemnation at an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine by the Group of Seven (G7) members and other countries, and actions by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In terms of regional efforts to prevent war, there are a wide range of initiatives in Europe. European integration began in 1952 with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established for the purpose of avoiding conflict over resources, and has evolved into the European Union (EU), a political and economic synthesis that has deepened cooperation across a broader range of areas, including economic and monetary union, common foreign affairs and national security policies, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was



established in 1975 as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and made into a permanent mechanism in the early 1990s, has also contributed to the prevention of war in terms of confidence building. On the other hand, a variety of regional frameworks has also been established in Asia, where tensions have been rising in recent years.

In addition, while the prevention of war through diplomacy ought to be pursued, amidst growing confrontation and tension among great powers, the government is also proceeding to build up its defense capabilities.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers about: actions taken by the UN and third countries in response to Russia's unlawful use of force and the evaluation of these actions under international law; the significance and limitations of the security cooperation frameworks for crisis reduction in the European region and among Western countries; and the need for discussion in the Diet in light of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine with respect to the limitations of diplomacy and an exclusively defense-oriented policy.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: the situation in Ukraine and the response by the international community; UN reform and Japan's role; efforts for reducing security risks in Asia; explaining the increase in defense spending to the public; issues in the three strategic documents and Japan's response to a contingency in Taiwan; and possession of counterstrike capabilities and Japan's Self-Defense Forces.

#### **(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers**

(Omitted)

#### **(2) Main Points of Discussion**

(Omitted)

## **2. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START) (February 15, 2023)**

The reduction and elimination of armaments, which are a direct means of conducting war, have been regarded as one of the central themes in the history of efforts to prevent war. With regard to nuclear weapons in particular, which first appeared at the end of World War II, given how their overwhelming destructive power and the long-term effects of radiation on the environment and on the human body could threaten the very survival of humankind, various efforts have been made to date even despite the complexities involving the interests of different countries. However, with Russia suggesting the use of nuclear weapons in its aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, the world is now facing a tough situation regarding nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a multilateral framework in the field of nuclear disarmament, entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. The NPT, which is a universal treaty with 191 countries and regions party to the treaty, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. At the same time, however, the inequality in permitting only five countries (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) to possess nuclear weapons and the discontent felt by non-nuclear-weapon states toward nuclear disarmament, which is the premise of the NPT, have led to a deepening of division among the NPT parties and have made reorganization of the regime an issue. Other issues include urging countries that have not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans nuclear weapons test explosions and any other nuclear explosions in all environments, to bring the treaty into force, and efforts for initiating negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In this context, bilateral frameworks between the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) have achieved a measure of success in nuclear disarmament, including a reduction

in the number of nuclear warheads worldwide from a peak of about 70,000 to less than 13,000. However, due to confrontation between the United States and Russia over treaty violations and concerns by the United States over China's missile development, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired in 2019, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is now the only nuclear disarmament treaty remaining between the United States and Russia promoting further reduction of and restriction on strategic offensive weapons, is set to expire in 2026, leaving the future of the framework uncertain.

Meanwhile, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a new multilateral framework for the realization of a "world without nuclear weapons" led by like-minded countries and civil society, entered into force in 2021, providing a legal ban on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The treaty is a new attempt to establish a norm banning nuclear weapons from a perspective of inhumanity, but nuclear-weapon states and their allies have not participated, opposing it based on the security role of nuclear weapons, reflecting differences of opinion with the parties to the treaty.

As the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war and yet depending on the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States for security, in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons, Japan pursues "bridge building," including by submitting draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly every year, while also taking into account the various conflicts in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks, such as the NPT and TPNW.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers about: the history, current status, and evaluation of various frameworks for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the current status of nuclear arms control and trends for strengthening deterrence; the impact that transformation of the international system has on arms control; and the need for concrete efforts for shifting the national security policy to one that does not rely on nuclear deterrence.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: the

nature of discussions and messages delivered at the G7 Hiroshima Summit; the evaluation of the TPNW and Japan's response; the current status and issues surrounding the NPT regime; the significance and evaluation of declaratory policies on the "no first use" of nuclear weapons; discussions on the nature of nuclear deterrence; efforts for getting China involved in arms control negotiations; response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and threats to use nuclear weapons; efforts for denuclearization and easing tension in Asia; the role of A-bomb survivors; evaluation of Japan's plutonium possession and its policy of returning to nuclear power generation; and discussion on nuclear sharing in Japan.

**(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers**

(Omitted)

**(2) Main Points of Discussion**

(Omitted)

### **3. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.) (February 22, 2023)**

Advances in science and technology have created weapons other than nuclear weapons that are highly destructive and lethal. Weapons for which there is a particular need to regulate their possession and use include biological weapons and chemical weapons—which, along with nuclear weapons, are called weapons of mass destruction—as well as anti-personnel landmines and cluster bombs. In addition, a new challenge that has emerged is measures dealing with new weapons created by the dramatic advances in technology in recent years, such as artificial intelligence (AI).

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which imposes a comprehensive ban on the development, production, possession and so on of biological weapons that use bacteria, viruses and the like to harm humans, came into effect in 1975, while the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which imposes a comprehensive ban on the development, production, possession and so on of chemical weapons that use toxic chemicals, poison gas to harm humans, and which stipulates the destruction of all chemical weapons held, came into effect in 1997. However, both conventions have issues. The latter, in particular, has not been able to pursue legal responsibility for the recent cases of chemical weapons use in Syria, despite the fact it has an implementing body (OPCW) as well as verification systems such as for declarations and inspections.

Weapons other than weapons of mass destruction, such as tanks, warships, and fighter jets, are called “conventional weapons.” Landmines and cluster bombs also fall into this category. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its annexed Protocols, which entered into force in 1983, prohibit and restrict the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Anti-personnel landmines are subject to the CCW and there are growing calls for even tighter regulation, but this was not achieved because of a lack of progress in discussions within the framework of the CCW.

However, the use and production of anti-personnel landmines, which indiscriminately harm noncombatant civilians and which cause extremely serious humanitarian problems, have been completely banned under the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), which entered into force in 1999. The treaty also mandated the destruction of stockpiled landmines and the clearance of buried landmines.

Cluster bombs, the effects of which spread over a wide area and which are highly likely to remain unexploded, have also been raised as a humanitarian problem causing harm to civilians, and their use, possession, and production has been banned under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which entered into force in 2010. The convention also mandated the destruction of stockpiled cluster bombs and the clearance of cluster bombs in contaminated areas.

While the MBT and CCM deserve special mention as examples of the important role played by NGOs and other civic movements in establishing norms that emphasize humanitarian perspectives in disarmament, they have issues in terms of universality and effectiveness, such as the use of both weapons in the war in Ukraine and the use of anti-personnel landmines by non-state actors.

Furthermore, with respect to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) in which targets are set and attacked autonomously by AI with no human involvement, although guiding principles on LAWS were adopted in 2019 under the CCW framework, discussions on the definition of LAWS and on the regulatory approach remain at a standstill.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers about: the security environment in East Asia, including Japan, and the current status of regional cooperation; the importance of a humanitarian approach to disarmament in contrast to arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, and the various activities for disarmament; and the current situation concerning anti-personnel landmines and cluster bombs.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: the state of landmine clearance efforts; evaluation of Japan's national security policy shift; the

response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the state of international order; discussion on autonomous weapons; peacebuilding in East Asia; Japan's human rights policies; divestment from companies that manufacture cluster bombs; evaluation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); Japan's foreign policy toward China; Japan's foreign policy toward Ukraine; view of the international situation in light of the conflict between the United States and China; and the role that the international community expects Japan to play.

**(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers**

(Omitted)

**(2) Main Points of Discussion**

(Omitted)

#### **4. UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies) (April 12, 2023)**

Following World War I, recognizing that the balance of power based on alliances between states had limitations in achieving international peace, the international community established the League of Nations, a global multilateral framework, and pinned high hopes on collective security under this framework. However, due in part to the non-participation of the United States, a major power, the League of Nations failed to live up to expectations and could not prevent the outbreak of another world war. Drawing on these lessons learned, the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945. The UN is the most universal international organization, with membership comprising almost every country in the world. In addition to areas directly related to international peace, such as conflict resolution, peacebuilding, antiterrorism measures, and disarmament and non-proliferation, the UN is engaged in issues across diverse fields, including poverty and development, human rights, refugee issues, the environment and climate change, disaster prevention, and infectious diseases.

Within the UN, the only body with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and the ability to make decisions that are legally binding on all member states, is the Security Council. The Security Council comprises five permanent members (the United States, Russia, England, France, and China) and 10 non-permanent members (elected for two-year terms). Also drawing on the lesson learned from the League of Nations that the effectiveness of collective security cannot be guaranteed without the participation and concerted action of the major powers, a mechanism of veto rights by permanent members is in place.

The number of UN member states has increased significantly from 51 in 1945 to the current 193, and the national strength of the respective countries has also changed considerably. There are, however, concerns about the makeup of the Security Council, which has remained unchanged since the number of non-permanent members was



increased from four to 10 in 1965 (when member states numbered 118), and there have been many cases when the Security Council has been unable to fulfill its functions due to a permanent member exercising its right of veto.

Discussion about reforming the Security Council began with the end of the Cold War. It gained momentum particularly in 2005, the 60th anniversary of the UN, when the G4 (Japan, Brazil, Germany, and India), member states of the African Union, and the “Uniting for Consensus” Group each submitted resolutions, but none were put to a vote and none came to fruition. Since then, there have been intergovernmental negotiations at the UN and discussion on Security Council reform has continued, but no headway has been made to date.

In this context, when Russia began its aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution of condemnation due to Russia exercising its right of veto, and in April 2022, in order to control any abuse of the right of veto, an instrument was introduced that requires accountability at the UN General Assembly if the right of veto is exercised.

Furthermore, to achieve international peace, international cooperation is important not only in conflict resolution, but also in economic, social, cultural, education, health and other fields. In addition to its six principal organs, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, the UN works with 15 specialized agencies, as well as funds and programs to make up the broader UN system and promote efforts in these areas.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers about: the need to reexamine the setback in reforming the Security Council in 2005 and the future direction of reform; the need for Japan to play a role as a semi-permanent member following reform of the Security Council; and dysfunction of the Security Council and the essence of the Ukraine problem.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: measures aimed at reforming the Security Council; the role of the General Assembly and direction for strengthening its authority in cases where the Security Council is not functioning; the

nature of Japan-United States relations with regard to UN diplomacy and other issues; having a voice in informal UN diplomacy; evaluation of the current state and future measures for increasing the number of Japanese personnel at UN-related agencies; possibilities for strengthening the judicial resolution of disputes; the future of relations between Japan and developing countries; the importance of aid that contributes to the independent and self-reliant development of developing countries; thoughts at the time and since the publication of “United Nations”; the role that Japan’s renunciation of war has played in the international community; the future of Japan’s support for Ukraine; the future of Japan’s diplomacy with China; and practical efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

**(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers**

(Omitted)

**(2) Main Points of Discussion**

(Omitted)

## **5. Developing Sustainable Defense Bases (April 26, 2023)**

Under Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, Japan's basic policy since the end of World War II has been exclusively defense-oriented, and the defense budget has generally remained within 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1967.

In recent years, in light of the surrounding security environment, including China's buildup of armaments and its active maritime expansion, North Korea's successive ballistic missile launches, and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in violation of international law, Japan has proceeded to develop its defense capabilities as well as its diplomacy.

Maintaining defense production and technological bases in one's own country has a bearing on the state of its defense capability development. Japan's defense industry, which is responsible for the production of defense equipment, consists of major original contractors (primes) and subcontractors (vendors) numbering in the thousands, but because of various circumstances—such as low profit margins due to sales channels for equipment being limited to the Self Defense Forces and a decrease in home-grown development due to an increase in procurement of finished products from the United States through Foreign Military Support (FMS)—a succession of companies have been exiting the defense business in recent years.

In addition to increasing the defense budget to a total of 43 trillion yen over five years, the three strategic documents revised in December 2022 outlined policies of introducing a new method of calculating profit margin to secure appropriate profits in the defense industry and promoting the overseas transfer of defense equipment. In order to give concrete form to these policies, the government submitted to the 211th Diet session (2023 ordinary session) the “Bill on Special Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for the Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities, etc.” for securing financial resources for increased defense spending and the “Bill on Strengthening Bases for Development and Production of Equipment, etc. Procured by the Ministry of Defense” for supporting the defense industry. The government is also engaged in

discussions to review the implementation guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which stipulate the conditions for overseas exports of defense equipment.

The current implementation guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology permit the export of equipment to countries with which Japan has a security cooperation relationship, but only for rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping equipment. The review of these conditions, however, also relates to the international joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft and to the establishment of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, which will affect not only the maintenance of Japan's defense bases but also the international security environment.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers about: reasons for the lack of progress in the domestic production and development of defense equipment and technology, and measures to address this; the need for a review of the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with a view to transferring defense equipment; support items for defense enterprises and the need for supply chain surveys and reorganization of defense enterprises.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: review of the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; support for small- and medium-sized subcontractors in the development of defense bases; measures for Japan's defense industry to eliminate reputational risk; standardization of equipment that contributes to development of Japan's defense industry; need for establishment of a security clearance system in the defense industry; issues for maintaining defense industry bases; evaluation of the government's policy increasing the defense budget to a total of 43 trillion yen over five years; negative effects from the non-disclosure of patents for security reasons; changes in the Japan-U.S. Alliance and validity of the three strategic documents.

**(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers**

(Omitted)

**(2) Main Points of Discussion**

(Omitted)

**6. War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order (Exchange of Views among Committee Members) (May 17, 2023)**

(Omitted)

### **III. Summary of Key Discussion Points**

Under the research theme for the current term, that is, “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order,” during the first year of research, the Committee heard opinions from and questioned voluntary testifiers on the following topics: Requirements for the Prevention of War; Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START); Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.); UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies); and Developing Sustainable Defense Bases. Finally, the Committee members exchanged views with each other.

Based on research conducted by the Committee, the key discussion points are summarized as follows.

#### **[Prevention of war, international law, and diplomacy]**

##### **(Response to the war in Ukraine)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while creating a system that enables a counteroffensive through external support will deter aggression, recognition of a country as the aggressor is necessary as a basis for enabling support that breaches the obligation of neutrality under international law; and if the Security Council is not functioning because a right of veto is being exercised, an emergency special session should be held to encourage member states to recognize Russia as the aggressor; and in doing so, any discontent that support for Ukraine will reduce support for developing countries should be stifled; and Japan should make diplomatic efforts to increase the number of supportive countries and isolate Russia, such as by providing solid support to developing countries that were receiving support from the former Soviet Union or that are suffering from the effects of soaring food and energy costs, and at the same time, by lowering the rule of law and democracy to the greatest common level

demanded by developing countries.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that in providing assistance to Ukraine, Japan can contribute in areas such as reconstruction assistance and landmine clearance, and that in addition to resolutely criticizing Russia's invasion of other countries' territory, Japan should also consider providing Ukraine with support that goes beyond economic assistance, recalling the history of the Gulf War; and that strengthening and expanding relations not only with the UN, but also with the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other international organizations and groups composed of countries that share common values, and deepening relations with ASEAN countries are important issues.

**(Response to nuclear threats by Russia)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to keep Russia from using nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine, the international community, including countries close to Russia such as BRICS and CIS countries, should send Russia a message that the use of nuclear weapons and threats to use nuclear weapons will never be tolerated and that even if nuclear weapons are used, Russia's objectives will not be achieved.

**(Pursuing legal responsibility for Russia's war crimes, etc.)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while avoiding impunity for Russian war crimes is important from the perspectives of international order and the rule of law, given the difficulty in holding permanent members of the Security Council legally responsible for aggression, there is hope for the International Criminal Court (ICC) that it will be a unprecedented institution that also has the potential to punish war criminals from countries that are not signatories to the ICC Rome Statute.
- Regarding the ICC, which is under political pressure and under pressure to cut its budget, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, in addition to strengthening the ICC by providing financial and political support, it is important that universal



jurisdiction over crimes subject to the ICC be exercised worldwide, and that Japan enact a human rights sanctions law as many Western countries already have, which imposes financial and visa-related sanctions on individuals who commit international crimes.

**(How to end the war in Ukraine)**

- Regarding the war in Ukraine, an opinion was expressed to the effect that it is a clear aggression by a nuclear-armed state with threats to use nuclear weapons; it must not benefit those who are violating the law; the international order that has existed since the founding of the UN cannot be allowed to be destroyed; it involves various issues, including a battle between the values of freedom and democracy and those of autocracy and dictatorship; the way to end the war is important and no compromises should be made in order to end it quickly.
- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that Ukraine continuing the war until Russia withdraws is not a way of protecting its citizens; realizing a ceasefire and building peace with the intervention of neutral UN forces is most important; and the crimes of Russia and some parts of Ukraine should be examined in a comprehensive manner.

**(Diplomatic means for reducing the risk of conflict)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that diplomatically reducing risk of conflict requires confidence-building measures in the form of contact; creating a framework for regular meetings and permanently institutionalizing it will enable contact without the need for appointments, which should reduce the risk of misunderstandings that can occur through explanations and communication; and in diplomacy with countries that have cause for confrontation, it is important to institutionalize a mechanism to engage only in cooperative matters.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to avoid military conflict with

countries such as North Korea, China, and Russia, Japan could take the initiative and gradually establish a forum at the intergovernmental level involving seven countries in the North Pacific region (the United States, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea), which would function on a permanent basis, discussing only constructive issues, and that ambassador-level discussions could be held every other week.

**(A new international order for peace and prosperity)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as a major economic power, it is important for Japan's own peace and security that it collaborate not only at the government level, but also at the municipal, civic, media, and business levels, serving as a bridge between Asian and African countries and the G7 countries, and developing joint relations for the future world; and it is in Japan's interest to pursue balanced policies while sharing wealth and driving the global economy.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, since Okinawa is located in the center of a huge market of about 2 billion people, including China, ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea, and it has historically not had a military capacity and has maintained long-standing friendly relations with neighboring countries, there are strong calls for it to become a center of peace and markets in Asia, rather than deploying meaningless missiles there as part of a military strategy; and using the Council for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Europe as a model, Japan should build the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), the UN of East Asia, in Shurijo Castle as a bridge between the United States and China, and this would be the new international order.

**(Independent diplomacy for peace led by citizens, local governments, etc.)**

- Regarding dialogue with countries in conflict, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, just as Okinawa Prefecture has initiated its own dialogue with the United States,

China, South Korea, and Taiwan, dialogue should also be promoted not only at the government level, but also at the level of citizens, local governments, and politicians.

**(Involvement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO))**

- The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the world's largest regional organization covering military, economic, and political relations, and an opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan should be actively involved in order to build cooperative relationships as part of a political or disarmament conference.

**(Diplomacy with developing countries)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while deepening bilateral relations with prominent developing countries like G20 members, Japan should increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) to other developing countries; Japan should work closely with developing countries through human resources development in education and healthcare, which are its strengths, and by teaching foreign students and trainees the freedoms that China is unable to teach; and it is also important to selectively provide geopolitically important areas such as India and Southeast Asia with infrastructure support, such as subways, which they need and in which Japan has technological predominance.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that ODA should be enhanced in both quality and quantity within the framework of its international non-military definition, and could include education on international relations for military personnel in developing countries and the provision of drug and smuggling patrol boats to Southeast Asian countries; and, as long as ODA is not reduced, it could be acceptable to provide a certain amount of equipment and other assistance through Official Security Assistance (OSA) to democratic countries under external threat.

**(Human rights diplomacy for peace)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that it is only by viewing the major issues and threats of the modern world from a human rights perspective that we can elucidate the root causes of a crisis and elicit guidelines for dealing with them; human rights diplomacy is of core importance for security, and if the international community had pursued legal responsibility for human rights violations against Russia and China at an early stage, the situation may not be as it is today, so the cost and ripple effects of neglecting human rights violations should not be underestimated; and it is important to be actively involved in security issues, but to apply wisdom toward balancing this with humanitarian diplomacy rather than resolving the issues by equipping oneself with arms.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as a country committed to human rights and democracy, Japan should exercise political leadership and strategically launch human rights diplomacy; and to this end, 10 articles are proposed to the government, including: preparation of the Principles/Plan for Human Rights Action as a substantive and robust political-level document to guide Japan's diplomacy, and adoption of these Principles/Plan by the Diet, enactment of a human rights sanctions law, and reform of trade policies, such as legislation of mandatory human rights due diligence by companies.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, given the extent of human rights violations by the Chinese government, since criticizing by name is inadequate, Japan should enact a human rights sanctions law, collaborate with Western countries in imposing financial and visa-related sanctions on individuals and groups, and compile and publish an annual human rights report to keep track of the human rights state of affairs; and it is important to connect with civil society in China that is fighting for human rights.

### **(Efforts for humanitarian disarmament)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, for Japan, which considers human security as one of the core pillars of diplomacy, humanitarian disarmament is an area in which it can be actively involved, and it is important for Japan to be proactive in rule-making; the key to successful humanitarian disarmament is partnership, close cooperation, and open communication with diverse actors, and it is important for governments to commit to concluding treaties, forming norms, and implementing measures through negotiation, and for civil society to record actual harm, build databases, support people with disabilities and communities, put risk aversion education into practice, and promote vocational training and social rehabilitation support for victims.

### **[Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation]**

#### **(Realizing a world without nuclear weapons)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, discourse, logic, and norms need to be built along with the security environment; but given that ongoing strategic competition and the multipolarity of the world (the current nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime has its origins in the bipolar structure of the Cold War era) are making cooperation difficult and that nuclear arms control has stagnated and regressed; in the medium term, a new nuclear arms control that includes China and incorporates multipolarity should be sought by applying deterrents and incentives, and in the short term, strategic dialogue should be promoted to improve crisis management, confidence building, and transparency, with the aim of maintaining the non-use of nuclear weapons.
- Given that the preconditions for establishing nuclear deterrence are deteriorating, the following seven recommendations for risk reduction were offered with a view to building a national security policy that does not rely on nuclear deterrence:  
(1) enforcement of the international norm that nuclear weapons must never be used;  
(2) promotion of mutual understanding of nuclear strategy through dialogue among

nuclear-armed states; (3) reducing the role of nuclear weapons through such measures as the “no first use” of nuclear weapons; (4) stopping production and reducing inventories of separated plutonium for civilian use which can be diverted for weapons use; and as recommendations for the elimination of nuclear weapons: (5) provision of negative security assurances; (6) collaboration between nuclear disarmament and sustainability; and (7) “bridge-building” by Japan to maintain and strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

**(How to correct the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons is necessary for security)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to appeal to the fallacy of the idea that possessing nuclear weapons is necessary for the security of one’s own country, it is necessary to expand recognition that nuclear weapons are dirty and possessing them is wrong—which is the objective of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—and it is necessary to verify whether security can truly be ensured through their possession; and the international community needs to take the stance that it will not tolerate Russia’s actions, and it needs to actively provide support to Ukraine so it can be victorious over a nuclear Russia.

**(NPT regime)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which 191 countries and regions are parties, is a cornerstone of international security that forms the basis of the postwar nuclear order; and although adoption of the final document was not possible at the August 2022 Review Conference, given that many countries condemned Russia’s actions and worked hard for its adoption, and that it is a forum where nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states can gather together for discussion, the NPT regime is important.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that advancing nuclear disarmament requires strengthening the NPT regime, but the problem is that, although the United States and Russia have reduced their nuclear arsenals, they still possess a large number of nuclear weapons, and China is actively increasing its arsenal—that is, the grand bargain premised on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is not being fulfilled; and Japan should more vocally assert the unfairness of this problem to China, one of the contributing factors.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as threats by Russia to use nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, in order to prevent a new nuclear-armed state from emerging, potential nuclear-armed states that view possession of nuclear weapons as desirable from a security perspective need to be dealt with; and apart from membership in alliances like NATO and participating in a nuclear-free zone, the next best course of action for Iran would be to discuss lifting sanctions based on a nuclear agreement, and for North Korea, it would be resuming negotiations with the United States and for China to exert influence behind the scenes.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as the hold of the NPT weakens, in addition to showing developing countries the benefits of staying in the NPT, conflict situations need to be resolved, and a stance of joint support for the NPT needs to be shown, including with the TPNW group; in addition, creation of a new framework or reform of an existing framework under the initiative of the UN is also conceivable.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that consideration should be given to incorporating negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states, which were declared at the time of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, into the NPT process in a legally binding manner.

**(TPNW)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while security and norms must both be pursued in order to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons, the TPNW—which

allows only norms to take precedence and rejects the concept of nuclear deterrence—is incompatible with Japan-United States security arrangements, and so joining the treaty is not a policy option for Japan; and, given that Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty are conferences for the parties to the treaty and countries are can be colored right or wrong depending on whether they participate in the treaty, Japan should not participate as an observer, and discussions should be held at NPT Review Conferences or other forums.

- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that, if Japan feels the importance of the TPNW as a treaty for eliminating nuclear weapons, Japan should endorse its objectives and show commitment to signing it—this would point to leadership for nuclear disarmament; Japan should also sign and ratify the TPNW as participation in the treaty is growing around the world; and regarding the Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty, since they provide more opportunities for dialogue with civil society than the NPT, and they are an important opportunity for countries under a “nuclear umbrella” to express their intentions, including why they cannot be a party to the treaty, Japan should participate as an observer and cooperate in areas where it can without joining the treaty, such as support for A-bomb survivors.

#### **(CTBT)**

- Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), an opinion was expressed to the effect that the treaty has not entered into force because eight of the 44 states required for entry into force have not ratified it; and although ratification by these countries is likely to be difficult, the leaders of all countries except Russia and North Korea share the norm of not conducting nuclear tests, and about 80% of the spirit of the treaty is respected.

#### **(FMCT)**

- Regarding the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), an opinion was expressed to



the effect that, since some countries do not really want to start negotiations, changing the consensus-based decision-making process is one option.

**(New START)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while nuclear disarmament in the past has been based not on NPT agreements, but on bilateral agreements or unilateral declarations by nuclear weapon states, if the United States and Russia cannot reach agreement and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in 2026, the bilateral nuclear arms control treaty that has continued since 1972 will cease, so some form of succession is important; and, while it would be preferable if negotiations could be conducted with all nuclear-armed states for all nuclear weapons, given that Russia is not likely to accept the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in negotiations, the United States should begin negotiations anyway, including for a simple five-year extension.

**(Cyberattacks on nuclear weapons systems)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that negotiating toward an agreement not to launch cyberattacks on each other's nuclear weapons systems should help build confidence.

**(Arms control negotiations with China, etc.)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that most important is to involve China in arms control negotiations; discussions should begin with issues that China is interested in, such as soft areas like the peaceful use of space, advance notification systems for ballistic missiles, or strategic stability dialogue which includes economic issues; and Japan should appeal to China to separate nuclear warheads from conventional warheads so that intermediate-range missiles capable of targeting Japan do not carry nuclear warheads.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that a possible topic for dialogue with China would be the denuclearization of North Korea; and prior to nuclear disarmament, negotiations should begin now for reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use, such as cyber issues and the establishment of a hotline.

**(Japan's role in denuclearization and easing tension in Asia)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan's roles could be to consider concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons among Japan, the United States, and South Korea, to realize regional security and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a package that includes ending the Korean War, and to negotiate with North Korea with a view to normalizing diplomatic relations in the long term.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan's current policies are excessively biased toward strengthening deterrence, and consideration needs to be given to policies for easing tensions in the region; and the role of citizen diplomacy should be emphasized and opportunities for dialogue between government and nongovernmental organizations should be actively created.

**(Appropriateness of Japan's nuclear possession and nuclear sharing)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, if Japan, an exemplary country of the NPT, went nuclear, all countries would go nuclear, undermining the nuclear order, so going nuclear is out of the question; and Japan should adhere to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that discussion of nuclear sharing is meaningful for getting the public to think about security with realism, but to do so, the "not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan" part of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would have to be changed; and given that nuclear sharing is a broad concept that could include operational aspects such as sharing responsibility and resolve when using nuclear weapons, Japan needs to rethink the nature of the Japan-

United States extended nuclear deterrence.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that discussion of nuclear sharing is a declaration of intent indicating doubts about confidence in the nuclear umbrella of the United States, and any discussion should be done with caution considering the impact it would have on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and on regional tensions.

### **[Disarmament of non-nuclear weapons]**

#### **(Consistency of policies with efforts for the universalization of the MBT)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to uphold norms established by the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), the Japanese government should condemn the new use of mines by the Myanmar military regime and the Russian government; and in order to ensure consistency in its efforts for the universalization of the MBT, with regard to Ukraine, which is a signatory to the MBT yet possesses a large number of landmines that should be destroyed, the Japanese government should encourage an investigation into the suspected use of anti-personnel landmines and condemn their use, while continuing its support for landmine clearance; and with regard to Myanmar, the Japanese government should examine with a high degree of accuracy the consistency and compatibility of its policy regarding the acceptance and training in Japan of military personnel from Myanmar who have used large numbers of landmines and caused extensive harm to civilians.

#### **(Humanitarian disarmament wash of anti-personnel landmines)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as with human rights issues, in order to promote disarmament, civil society needs to be critical of the movement that could be called “humanitarian disarmament wash,” which advocates policies of landmine clearance and victim support while at the same time resulting in the expanded use of landmines; and there are also problems with the way disarmament is communicated in education and in the media.

**(Efforts for universalization of the CCM)**

- Regarding cluster bombs, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, in light of the evident harm to civilians caused by the use of cluster bombs by the Syrian government backed by the Russian government and that the Russian government used cluster bombs in the war in Ukraine, the Japanese government should make greater efforts to promote the universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM); and the Japanese government should maintain its stance of also pressing the Ukrainian government, which is not a signatory to the CCM, not to use cluster bombs.

**(Divestment from companies that manufacture cluster bombs)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that investing in companies that manufacture cluster bombs is now the biggest taboo in the world, and the Japanese government should come out with a clear stance that it will not use people's pensions to invest in or finance companies that manufacture inhumane weapons, and it should actively tackle this matter, including the establishment of domestic legislation.

**(Response to certain conventional weapons)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) does not adequately regulate incendiary weapons and discussions specific to these weapons are required; and, while there have been efforts seeking restrictions on the use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas by means of non-legally binding political declarations, the Japanese government should contribute to the universalization of these declarations.

**(Response to LAWS)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while rapid advances in technology are

creating new threats linked to human rights violations and it is important to scrutinize and regulate them from a human rights perspective, fully autonomous weapons are particularly dangerous as they change the regulatory paradigm for war crimes, and they should be comprehensively banned; but given that discussions within the consensus-based CCW framework have stalled, the Japanese government should support negotiations through an alternative process; and Japan should not only clearly state that it will not develop lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), but also actively promote a treaty for a complete ban, which it has stated is too early to do.

#### **[UN reform]**

##### **(Proposal for Security Council reform)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that it is important for Japan to be able to participate for as long as possible in deliberations of the Security Council and, where necessary, to participate in negotiations, and since there is no use for the right of veto, rather than continue seeking a permanent seat, which is difficult to accomplish, the Japanese government should pursue reform to establish a new category of “semi-permanent members” (longer-term, re-electable seats) with no right of veto.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that two borders are important in realizing Security Council reform: 100, which is more than 97 or half the UN membership, and 129, which is necessary to amend the Charter; since there is potential if the number of votes in favor of a proposed reform exceeds 100, the process can be repeated making modifications as required until the votes reach 129; however, if Japan turns to pursuing a semi-permanent seat, since teaming up with India would be difficult as it is determined to pursue a permanent seat with a right of veto, the G4 framework will have to be reconsidered.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while it would be extremely difficult to abolish the right of veto, given China’s desire to avoid being labeled as always in lockstep with Russia, it is worth trying to create a system whereby the right of veto

cannot be exercised unless opposed by two permanent members.

**(Method for formulating a proposal for Security Council reform)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan has never ruled Africa as a colonial power, is reluctant to forcefully interfere in domestic affairs, and is the only non-Western country in the G7 and the only one with experience as a developing country, and as such, Japan should come up with a reform proposal based on its important position to pull developing countries closer to the developed countries; and Japan should establish an advisory panel under the prime minister to formulate a concrete proposal, and in concert with the moves under Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for reform of the Security Council, Japan should appeal to countries around the world and work with other friendly nations to formulate a proposal, while taking a stronger approach to developing countries.

**(Response to dysfunction of the Security Council due to the right of veto)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that it is important to place more emphasis on the General Assembly, such as building a mechanism or adopting a resolution that places the General Assembly at the center of decisions when the Security Council does not function due to the right of veto; and consideration should also be given to how to change the harmful effects of focusing on the veto power of the Security Council by creating a mechanism outside the UN that is comprised of like-minded countries.

**(Response to problems related to operation of the Security Council)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the way in which the Security Council operates, such as how non-permanent members are forced to follow proposals determined only by the permanent members due to a lack of time, should be changed.

**(Measures for increasing Japanese personnel at UN-related agencies)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to increase the number of Japanese personnel at UN-related agencies, the budget for the Junior Professional Officers (JPO) Programme should be increased.

**[Prevention of war and defense capabilities]**

**(Need to strengthen defense capabilities)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, as the world enters a new era of confrontation and is unlikely to return to an era of global cooperation, it is important for Japan to develop its defense bases; in addition to strengthening various national capabilities in anticipation of hybrid warfare, Japan needs to strengthen its collective defense capabilities in cooperation with like-minded countries and other nations; and only by practicing the will and ability to fight on its own can Japan gain the support of allies.

**(Possession of counterstrike capabilities)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in order to prevent aggression against Japan, in addition to diplomacy, it is important for Japan to possess counterstrike capabilities and to make countries aware of the tremendous damage that would result from an offensive against Japan; and possessing counterstrike capabilities is also important when considering possible future negotiations on missile reduction in East Asia.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, while counterstrike capabilities should not be denied, it is essential that necessary defense capabilities be maintained in the rear as a deterrent to China, and there are questions of priority; in addition, counterstrike capabilities should only be possessed after adequate explanation, discussion and coordination with the United States regarding equipment details, including the latest equipment; and there should be discussion not only about concerns

of it being a preemptive strike, but also about the cost of a delayed counterattack.

- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that countering nuclear-armed states like Russia and China by deploying missiles on the front lines is pointless as a military strategy; and instead of adopting a combative posture in Asia, it is in Japan's interest to pursue balanced policies while sharing wealth with other countries and driving the global economy.

**(The Japan-U.S. Alliance and counterstrike capabilities)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the traditional Japan-U.S. Alliance, in which the United States assumes primary responsibility for defense, has changed significantly, and now, with things proceeding on the assumption that the United States would not take action even if Japan was attacked, pointing its own missiles at the three nuclear-armed states in the vicinity would be detrimental to Japan's security; and diplomacy is important because if deterrence fails, Japan would be turned into a battlefield, as it is in Ukraine.
- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that the Japan-United States security arrangements remain a pillar of security in Asia, with an unchanged basic framework of the United States being primarily responsible for offensive operational capabilities and Japan for defensive operational capabilities; both Japan and the United States are committed to each other's efforts; and in light of China's hegemonic moves and Russia's aggression against Ukraine, Japan needs to strengthen its defense capabilities, and the deployment of missiles is based on the current situation in the region and the influence of neighboring countries, so does not disrupt regional security.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation also need to be reviewed in order to ensure the effectiveness of Japan-United States defense cooperation.



**(Peacebuilding in East Asia)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that nuclear deterrence should be left to the United States and Japan should focus on closing the missile gap with China to strengthen deterrence, while simultaneously pursuing confidence-building measures to share threat perceptions and dispel suspicion.

**(Public debate on the change in Japan's national security policy)**

- Regarding the shift in Japan's national security policy resulting from the revision of the three strategic documents, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, with public debate having not yet deepened, the Diet should give serious consideration to the topic while taking into account the opinions of those who have experience in the respective fields who can sensibly understand the risks involved; and discussion should also be held on whether peace can be maintained by increasing the defense budget and deploying missiles, whether it is possible to possess counterstrike capabilities while Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan is in place and an exclusively defense-oriented policy is the basic policy, and what would be the economic impact of hostilities with China and other countries.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that discussion is needed to determine whether the public accepts the change in Japan's national security policy based on the understanding that Japan would be on the front line and exposed to danger in the event of war; and young people in particular need to be educated about the realities of war.

**(Validity of the policy to increase defense spending)**

- Regarding the policy increasing the defense budget to a total of 43 trillion yen over five years, an opinion was expressed to the effect that there is a lack of government explanation about the optimality and efficiency of the policy; there are concerns that the policy is excessive in view of Japan's future economic strength, technical capabilities, and aging social structure, and it could sap society of its vitality; the

public has voiced considerable opposition to the idea of hiking taxes to provide the necessary financial resources; there are concerns that, while Japan cannot rival China no matter how much it increases defense spending, increasing its defense budget will pose a threat to neighboring countries, which could shake the economic and social relationships Japan has built to date and could lead to continued competition with China and North Korea to expand their armaments; and from the perspective of how Japan's limited budget should be allocated, there needs to be broader general discussion about the validity of the increase in defense spending.

- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that, even within the same East Asian security environment, South Korea's defense budget per capita is more than double that of Japan, so Japan's increase in defense spending is necessary to ensure the security of its people given the situation in neighboring countries, and is not excessive.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan should carefully explain its policy to increase spending to many countries to gain their understanding, and should explain it to the citizens who will be asked to bear the burden of the increase in defense spending to gain their understanding and acceptance.

**(How to proceed with defense equipment transfers)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the defense industry is the very essence of the defense capabilities of a country; and while it is not possible for the defense industry to be maintained and prosper with the Ministry of Defense as its only customer, it would be better to leave the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology unchanged and for decisions to be made flexibly by reviewing the implementation guidelines, for example, by changing the "positive list" approach which limits purpose to five sectors, such as rescue, and by expanding the scope of equipment that can be exported, including firearms, ammunition, surveillance radars, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles, and landmine

detectors.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that consideration needs to be given to “thrust transfer”—whereby Japan provides equipment, expenditure and economic assistance to a certain country at its request which in turn provides Ukraine with its own lethal weapons—and to a new framework that would enable the transfer of next-generation fighter aircraft (FX), currently under development in Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy, to third countries, as well as to concluding necessary agreements and treaties with the countries concerned; and the Japanese government needs to shoulder a share of the costs of displaying equipment at equipment fairs and other events from the defense budget.
- On the other hand, an opinion was expressed to the effect that there are concerns that, if the revision of implementation guidelines allows the transfer of lethal equipment overseas, it will encourage conflict and increase regional tensions, damage Japan’s credibility as a peace-loving nation, and result in Japanese NGOs working in conflict zones being targeted. In response, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that it does not mean NGOs would not be targeted if Japan did not export arms.

**(Efforts for promoting the export of defense equipment)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in the case of defense equipment delivered to the Self-Defense Forces, one of the reasons for the lack of progress in exporting it is the need for English-language manuals and the creation of black boxes, so the government should formalize export versions of the equipment; in addition, the partial return of development costs to the national treasury should be reviewed and a format should be adopted in which the private sector manufactures goods and the national government exports them.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, from now on, it will be necessary to promote equipment transfers by considering what kind of equipment will lead to improvements in stability, industry, technology, and employment in the partner

country; and in view of the fact that embassies and ambassadors will play an increasing role in creating guidelines, asking opinions, and working to persuade those countries, a total improvement is needed in this area, including clarifying the responsibilities of embassies in transfers of defense equipment.

**(Preventing outflows of technology in the transfer of defense equipment)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the Wassenaar Arrangement alone will not curb outflows of technology, and going forward, countries that possess each technology will need to get together and carefully discuss which countries should be permitted to receive exports of the technology; in addition, as in the United States, where the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) stipulates a kind of “negative list” of technologies that cannot be exported and executive committees of Congress and the Department of Defense make political decisions on exports, Japan needs to develop a similar mechanism; and consideration should also be given to technical ways of black-boxing the final process of manufacturing technologies.

**(Efforts to strengthen research and development of defense equipment)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the research and development budget for defense equipment should be increased; in addition to research funding that has been provided in the past, new financial assistance and facility support should be provided to help cross the “valley of death” to commercialization; and, since strengthening defense production and technological bases, where progress is being made in dual-use technologies, is expected to have a ripple effect on the industry as a whole, with reference to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the United States Department of Defense, development of a mechanism to enable cooperative activities among industry, government, and academia should be promoted, such as expanding the security field to the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI) so that engineering research at universities can be utilized for national security.

**(Security clearance system)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that engineers in the world fundamentally work together as a single community based on trust, maintaining a certain level of security; and the security clearance of engineers is also important for Japan to maintain a certain level of technology in the world.

**(Procurement of defense equipment)**

- Regarding the procurement of defense equipment, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, although licensed domestic production had been mainstream in the postwar period, since it is coming to an end due to mounting difficulties in importing technology from the United States and other countries, Japan needs to aim for joint domestic production, joint development, and independent domestic production; and for independent domestic production, consideration should be given to something like a Japanese version of Skunk Works, Lockheed Martin's covert division for advanced development.

**(Ownership of facilities manufacturing defense equipment)**

- Regarding the United States system of government owned, contractor operated (GOCO) in which the government owns a facility and a company operates it, which is clearly discussed in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) as a form of government ownership of defense equipment manufacturing facilities, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, since companies do not need to pay initial costs thus easing their burden, this form of ownership should be actively utilized, not only when there is no other means.

**(Restructuring of the defense industry)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that defense-related companies in the United States have more or less been reorganized into four companies following the

acquisitions and mergers of 35 major companies as a result of the Clinton Administration's efforts to encourage restructuring; and Japan should also consider restructuring its defense industry.

- On the other hand, an opinion was also expressed to the effect that, in the case of Japan's defense industry, even at primes, defense divisions account for less than 10% of the entire company, and even if these divisions were separated, integrated, and reorganized, creating a huge military supply enterprise would not be possible; and the purpose of the legislative bill for developing defense industry bases is to strengthen the defense industry amid such a reality.

**(Support for small- and medium-sized subcontractors in the development of defense bases)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, in the sustainable development of defense bases, it is extremely important to maintain a large number of small- and medium-sized subcontractors, which are facing crises of management and technology succession in the wake of major companies pulling out of the industry; a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) risk analysis of not only major companies but also subcontractors should be conducted, based on the ratio of their defense divisions to their entire business and on the availability of alternative products from other companies, and financial assistance or some sort of support such as for mergers or withdrawal should be provided if it is determined the company is indispensable to Japan; and the government needs to take an active lead in conducting a supply chain survey necessary for this purpose, under a policy that obligates companies to endeavor to respond to the survey.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that, since the number of companies with dual-use technologies will increase in the future, which will strengthen peripheral businesses around the defense industry, in providing support, a system will need to be designed that provides subsidies not only to the defense industry, but also from the

relatively broad perspective of whether the technology can be used for defense or not.

**(Reputational risk in the defense industry)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that to eliminate reputational risk in the defense industry, in addition to reorganizing and increasing the scale of companies specializing in defense, efforts are needed to rebuild an education and culture that recognizes what is necessary for a better society.
- An opinion was expressed to the effect that if emphasis is placed on reputational risk that is too perfunctory and not worth discussing, Japan will fall behind the rest of the world.

**(Standardization of defense equipment)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that the government always needs to produce equipment with uniform standards, because if defense equipment is matched to the standards of weapons possessed by NATO and the United States and equipment of neighboring allies, making them easier to use and export, not only will it be good for business, but it will also be able to provide equipment for joint training and to receive provision of a variety of equipment from other countries in the event of a contingency; and in doing so, unlike consumable items where standardization is considered useful, because of frequency issues and so on, standardization of defense equipment should be clarified according to purpose or item, for example, communication systems that are not fully open in each country should be separated out or different standards should be established.

**(Security in the space and cyber domains)**

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that investment should be increased in cutting-edge domains such as space and cyber, and consideration should also be given to initiatives that complement Japan-United States security arrangements by using

satellites to gather information in East Asia; in view of the agreement by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. 2+2) in January 2023 on the applicability of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to attacks within space, Japan needs to design systems and security clearance arrangements that are sufficient for its inclusion in the Five Eyes and be able to conduct cyber intelligence; a new institutional design for operating space systems using both public and private sector technologies needs to be added to operations, and consideration also needs to be given to incorporating domestic technology into that design; and not only should technology related to the space domain not be exported to states of concern, but exports should be handled on an exception basis.

- An opinion was expressed to the effect that Japan should develop an active cyber defense capability and implementation system, as well as enact new basic legislation on cybersecurity in order to take measures in the field of cybersecurity.

**(System for the non-disclosure of patents that affect security amid increasing dual-use technologies)**

- Regarding the system for the non-disclosure of patents, an opinion was expressed to the effect that, amid concerns that the system would hinder development from the broad application of technologies in the civilian sector, Japan needs to operate the system by striking a balance between the benefits of making patents public and the security benefits of keeping them closed, protect sensitive technologies, and at the same time, increase incentives for applicants to apply for patents even if they are not public; and the most difficult issue is to design a system that examines the pros and cons of non-disclosure, and if this issue can be overcome, Japan should operate the system.



## **Afterword**

Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, is a serious challenge to the international order in that a nuclear power—a permanent member of the UN Security Council tasked with the primary responsibility of international peace and stability—has openly committed an act of aggression in violation of international law, discrediting the premise of collective security provided by the UN, and has revealed that the foundations of international peace laid by the international community since the end of World War II are not necessarily rock-solid.

In this context, with its sights set squarely on the crisis, the Committee has set “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” as the research theme for this three-year term, and in the first year, investigated requirements for the prevention of war, disarmament and non-proliferation, UN reform, and development of sustainable defense bases.

The first year of research highlighted a variety of issues regarding the challenges and specific efforts for international law, diplomacy, and defense capabilities for the prevention of war; the nature of the NPT regime and the role of the TPNW in promoting effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the significance of humanitarian norms in promoting various disarmament measures; the need for Security Council reform as well as UN reform that can be achieved within the scope of the current UN Charter; and the state of Japan's defense policy and defense industry.

Being an issue that concerns the nature of international politics, the research theme proposed by the Committee for this three-year term requires research in a wide range of fields. Therefore, from the second year onwards, while bearing in mind the summary of discussion points described in this interim report, the Committee proposes to conduct further research from various perspectives, including politics, diplomacy, economics, and military, on how effective it would be to combine efforts under various multilateral and bilateral frameworks as well as those among like-minded countries, in order to build a new

international order required to resolve problems of war and peace.

## Reference 1 Timeline of Deliberations

Diet session and date	Outline
<p>210th (Extraordinary session)</p> <p>October 3, 2022</p> <p>December 10</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of the Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security at a plenary meeting</li> <li>• Election of the Committee Chair (INOBUCHI Kuniko (LDP))</li> <li>• Election of Directors</li> <li>• Decision on this three-year term’s research theme: “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order”</li> </ul>
<p>211th (Ordinary session)</p> <p>February 8, 2023</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Requirements for the Prevention of War)</li> </ul> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>ASADA Masahiko Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University</p> <p>UETA Takako Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Kagawa University Lecturer, Graduate School, Sophia University</p> <p>KODA Yoji Former Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force</p>

- February 15 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START))

(Voluntary testifiers)

SANO Toshio

Acting Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission  
Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on  
Disarmament

TOSAKI Hirofumi

Director, Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology,  
the Japan Institute of International Affairs

SUZUKI Tatsujiro

Vice Director and Professor, Research Center for Nuclear  
Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University

- February 22 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.))

(Voluntary testifiers)

HABA Kumiko

Emeritus Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

Specially Appointed Professor, Kanagawa University

DOI Kanae

Japan Director, Human Rights Watch

MEKATA Motoko

Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University

- April 12 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies))

(Voluntary testifiers)

KITAOKA Shinichi

Emeritus Professor, The University of Tokyo

AKASHI Yasushi

Chairman of the Board, Kyoto International Conference Center

YOSHIKAWA Motohide

Distinguished Professor, International Christian University  
Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

- April 26 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Developing Sustainable Defense Bases)

(Voluntary testifiers)

MIYAGAWA Makio

Former Special Advisor on National Security, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat

Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Malaysia

MORIMOTO Satoshi

Advisor, Takushoku University

NISHIYAMA Junichi

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Future Engineering

- May 17
- Exchange of views among Committee members (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order”)

- June 7
- Decision on the research report and its submission to the President of the House of Councillors
  - Decision to offer the report at a plenary meeting

## Reference 2

### List of Committee Members

Chair	INOGUCHI Kuniko (LDP)
Director	ASAHI Kentaro (LDP)
Director	KOYARI Takashi (LDP)
Director	MATSUKAWA Rui (LDP)
Director	SHIOMURA Ayaka (CDP)
Director	HIRAKI Daisaku (KP)
Director	KUSHIDA Seiichi (JIP)
Director	HAMAGUCHI Makoto (DPFP-SR)
Director	IWABUCHI Tomo (JCP)
	AKAMATSU Ken (LDP)
	IKUINA Akiko (LDP)
	IMAI Eriko (LDP)
	UENO Michiko (LDP)
	NAGAI Manabu (LDP)
	HASEGAWA Hideharu (LDP)
	MORI Masako (LDP)
	YOSHIKAWA Yumi (LDP)
	HATA Jiro (CDP)
	MIKAMI Eri (CDP)
	MIZUNO Motoko (CDP)
	MIYAGUCHI Haruko (CDP)
	TAKAHASHI Mitsuo (KP)
	KANEKO Michihito (JIP)
	MATSUNO Akemi (JIP)
	IHA Yoichi (OW)

Note:	LDP:	Liberal Democratic Party
	CDP:	The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Social Democratic Party
	KP:	Komeito
	JIP:	Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party)
	DPFP-SR:	Democratic Party For the People and The Shin-Ryokufukai
	JCP:	Japanese Communist Party
	OW:	Okinawa Whirlwind

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