

Provisional Translation

**Research Report on
Foreign Affairs and National Security
(Excerpt)**

June 2025

**Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security
House of Councillors
The National Diet of Japan**

Contents

I. Research Process	1
II. Research Outline	3
1. Current State and Issues Surrounding the Situation in the Middle East (February 12, 2025)	3
2. Current State and Issues Surrounding the War in Ukraine (February 19, 2025).....	6
3. Challenges and Approaches toward Achieving Inclusive Peace (February 26, 2025)	8
4. War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order (Exchange of Views among Committee Members) (April 16, 2025) (Omitted)	
III. Recommendations	12
Reference 1 Timeline of Deliberations	27
Reference 2 List of Committee Members.....	38

I. Research Process

Research committees in the House of Councillors are a unique feature of the House of Councillors. Taking note of the fact that the House of Councillors is not dissolved and that members serve six-year terms, research committees are established for the purpose of conducting long-term, comprehensive research relating to fundamental matters of government over a period of three years. At the 210th Diet session (extraordinary session) on October 3, 2022, the Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security was established for the purpose of conducting long-term, comprehensive research on foreign affairs and national security. The Committee decided that the research theme for this three-year term would be “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order.”

In the first year of research, to mark the beginning of the three-year research, the Committee first heard the opinions of and questioned voluntary testifiers on the “Requirements for the Prevention of War.” The Committee then proceeded with research through hearing the opinions of and questioning voluntary testifiers on the following subjects: “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START),” “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.),” “UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies),” and “Developing Sustainable Defense Bases.” After the Committee members exchanged views with each other, the Committee decided on the research report (interim report) and submitted it to the President of the House of Councillors on June 7, 2023.

In the second year of research, the Committee proceeded with research through hearing the opinions of and questioning voluntary testifiers on the following subjects: “Efforts and Challenges in International Rule-Making on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and Ensuring Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC),” “Armed Conflicts, etc. and Efforts and Challenges towards

Practicing and Rebuilding Humanitarianism,” “Efforts and Challenges in Starting Negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT),” “Efforts and Challenges in Ensuring International Food and Energy Security and Human Security, etc., in View of the Impact of Climate Change and Armed Conflicts, etc.,” and “Measures and Efforts to Address the Impacts of Climate Change on Maritime Legal Order.” After the Committee members exchanged views with each other, the Committee decided on the research report (interim report) and submitted it to the President of the House of Councillors on June 5, 2024.

In the third year of research, which is the primary focus of this report, during the 217th Diet session (ordinary session), based on research conducted in the first and second years, and in view of the need for research focused on problems currently occurring, the Committee held meetings on the following subjects: “Current State and Issues Surrounding the Situation in the Middle East” and “Current State and Issues Surrounding the War in Ukraine.” Furthermore, as a summary of research conducted over the current three-year period, the Committee addressed the subject “Challenges and Approaches toward Achieving Inclusive Peace.” Each time, the Committee heard the opinions of three voluntary testifiers and asked them questions (February 12, 19, and 26, 2025). Then, the Committee members exchanged views with each other based on research conducted over the current three-year period (April 16, 2025).

II. Research Outline

1. Current State and Issues Surrounding the Situation in the Middle East (February 12, 2025)

The Middle East is the world's largest supplier of energy resources, accounting for approximately 50% of the world's oil reserves and about 40% of the world's natural gas reserves. The region is also extremely important geopolitically, located at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa and at a strategic point on sea lanes. In particular, for Japan—which relies heavily on imports from overseas for much of its food and energy, importing over 90% of its crude oil from this region—ensuring peace and stability and the security of sea lanes in the Middle East is of paramount importance, including from the perspective of energy security.

On the other hand, the Middle East has been marked by various conflicts and confrontations throughout its history, and continues to face a number of destabilizing factors. Triggered by the terrorist attacks against Israel by Hamas and others on October 7, 2023, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched large-scale airstrikes and ground operations inside the Gaza Strip, where Hamas is based. An extremely serious humanitarian crisis has emerged in Gaza, with over 40,000 civilian casualties, approximately 90% of residents forced to evacuate, and major infrastructure destroyed. Amidst this situation, violations of international humanitarian law by both Israel and Hamas have also been pointed out, and in November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that it had issued warrants of arrest for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Moreover, amidst ongoing international debate over the application of international humanitarian law, points have also been raised about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by the IDF in military operations and the resulting harm to civilians.

Furthermore, in the border area between northern Israel and southern Lebanon, armed

clashes intensified between the IDF and Hezbollah, a Shiite militant group (anti-government forces) in Lebanon. In October 2024, the IDF launched a ground invasion into Lebanon, and although a ceasefire between the Israeli and Lebanese governments came into effect in November, the IDF has continued to maintain a presence in southern Lebanon. Moreover, between Israel and Iran, October 2024 saw Iran launch a large-scale ballistic missile attack against Israel and Israel respond with strikes on Iranian military facilities. There have also been ongoing attacks by Yemeni Houthis against civilian vessels in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to this series of developments triggered in part by the situation in Gaza, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 has added to the growing instability in the Middle East.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers and asked them questions about: the background to the Gaza ceasefire agreement in January 2025 and the challenges that lie ahead; the issue of Iran's nuclear development and the moves of the United States and Israel; the actual military use of AI by Israel in its attacks against Hamas; risks associated with the military use of AI and humanitarian law issues such as collateral damage to civilians; the current state of norms for ensuring compliance with international law in modern international society; and the activities of the ICC regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: reasons behind the escalation of the Gaza conflict; challenges related to a ceasefire and reconstruction of Gaza, and Japan's role in this; evaluations of media coverage; changes within Iran and the outlook for Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime; the current state of the military use of AI; the role and future challenges of the ICC; issues facing Japan with regard to core crimes; and the ideal state of a new international order.

(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers

(Omitted)

(2) Main Points of Discussion

(Omitted)

2. Current State and Issues Surrounding the War in Ukraine (February 19, 2025)

The war in Ukraine has continued to this day since Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Under the international order established after World War II, norms rejecting unilateral change to the status quo by force have been developed, including the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and the principle of the non-use of force as stipulated in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the United Nations Charter. However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine represents a blatant violation of such norms by a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council—a body which bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. This act shakes the very foundations of the international order. Furthermore, the war has involved serious violations of international humanitarian law, including brutal and inhumane acts such as the massacre in Bucha by Russian forces. In addition, from the outset of the aggression, Russia has repeatedly engaged in rhetoric and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use nuclear weapons.

Amidst these developments, in June 2022, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted a new Strategic Concept which serves as a guideline for its actions. In this document, NATO identified Russia as the most significant and direct threat to the security of its member states and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and it is working to strengthen its deterrence and defense capabilities. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has brought about major changes to the security environment in Europe. For instance, Finland and Sweden, which had historically maintained a policy of neutrality, joined NATO in April 2023 and March 2024, respectively.

Furthermore, the new Strategic Concept also points to the deepening strategic relationship between China and Russia, and recognizing that this could have a direct impact on the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, it identifies the Indo-Pacific as a region of importance for NATO, calling for enhanced dialogue and cooperation with partners in this region.

Since 2022, Japan has also consistently expressed a strong sense of crisis at the NATO Summit and other forums, stating that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” and has acknowledged that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions is inseparable.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers and asked them questions about: NATO’s transformation since the Cold War and issues surrounding the war in Ukraine; challenges for Japan in light of the war in Ukraine and the significance of Japan-NATO cooperation; the war in Ukraine as a classical interstate war and the role of nuclear weapons; implications of the war in Ukraine for Japan; the legal assessment of Russia’s use of force in the war in Ukraine; the impact of the war in Ukraine on the international legal order; and Japan’s role in establishing the rule of law in the international community.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: debate on a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine and the realization of a just peace; how the international legal order should be in light of the war in Ukraine; Japan’s engagement with Ukraine; an Asian version of NATO; the impact on the Russian economy; Japan’s security challenges and responses in light of the war in Ukraine; and whether there exists a way to reclaim the Northern Territories based on international law utilizing the opportunity of the war in Ukraine.

(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers

(Omitted)

(2) Main Points of Discussion

(Omitted)

3. Challenges and Approaches toward Achieving Inclusive Peace (February 26, 2025)

After the end of the Cold War, the United States and other liberal democratic nations took the lead in maintaining and developing an international order based on values and principles such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This was accompanied by a growing trend of international cooperation, as well as the advancement of economic globalization and interdependence. Under such an international order, China, in particular, has expanded its influence and strengthened its voice within the international community, backed by its economic development since the 2000s. At the same time, many developing countries have also achieved economic growth, with India and other emerging and developing nations—collectively referred to as the “Global South”—having risen in prominence. As a result, the international community has become increasingly diverse, and a shift in the power balance is occurring.

In addition, security challenges are becoming increasingly broad and diverse, as evidenced by responses in the space and cyber domains, economic security initiatives such as ensuring the resilience of supply chains for semiconductors and critical minerals and developing and protecting critical and advanced technologies, as well as the impacts of climate change on security—an issue that was also a focus of the Committee’s second year of research. These developments reflect the significant changes in the security environment in the international community.

Furthermore, as a negative aspect of globalization, within many countries, including developed countries, there are growing concerns over the destabilization of democratic political systems due to the emergence of political and social tensions and divisions driven by the rise of populism amid widening economic disparities.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which began amid such changes in February 2022, is shaking the very foundations of the post-Cold War international order. Furthermore, the deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian situation since October

2023—particularly the critical humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip—is making divisions within the international community even more complex.

However, the United Nations (UN), which is expected to respond to urgent issues in the international community—and in particular the Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security—is facing difficulties in responding to these issues due to a lack of consensus among its permanent members. Meanwhile, although the UN General Assembly has adopted successive resolutions related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a number of countries have abstained or voted against them. Moreover, given the diverse positions taken by member states and their varying relationships with Russia, the response taken by the international community cannot necessarily be described as unified.

Today, amidst an unsettled international order and differing views on how it should be, Japan advocates a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) that upholds freedom and the rule of law and respects diversity, inclusiveness, and openness—advocating for non-exclusion, no bloc formation, and not imposing values. Japan is actively working to ensure that this vision is shared within the international community.

With these points in mind, the Committee heard the respective opinions of the voluntary testifiers and asked them questions about: disruption of the post-World War II international order by the war in Ukraine; the importance of Japan, as a defender of the liberal international order, promoting the concept of an international order based on diversity, inclusiveness, and openness; isolationism and opportunism under the second Trump administration and the crisis of the United States leadership in multilateral frameworks; the challenges Japan should address through multilateral frameworks amidst wavering leadership by the United States; the current weakening of democratic and liberal norms and the causes of the populist wave underlying it; and measures Japan should take in light of the current situation in which narratives around democracy are being undermined by both authoritarian and democratic states.

The question and answer session included discussion on the following matters: the war

in Ukraine and the international order; multilateral frameworks in achieving inclusive peace; the second Trump administration and nationalism; democracy and populism; and the role Japan should play in achieving inclusive peace.

(1) Outline of Opinions by Voluntary Testifiers

(Omitted)

(2) Main Points of Discussion

(Omitted)

4. War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order (Exchange of Views among Committee Members) (April 16, 2025)

(Omitted)

III. Recommendations

Based on its three years of research, the Committee makes recommendations as follows regarding “War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order.”

1. Ideal State of a New International Order and Approaches toward its Establishment

(Current state of the international order)

After World War II, an international order was built upon the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and the principle of the non-use of force, as stipulated in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the United Nations Charter, as well as key pillars such as economic openness, political reciprocity, and multilateral management.

Following the end of the Cold War, an international order based on values and principles such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law continued to develop, accompanied by increased international cooperation and economic globalization and interdependence. At the same time, however, significant changes in the international situation have emerged, including the growing influence of China and the rise of India and other emerging and developing nations—collectively referred to as the “Global South.” Moreover, widening economic disparities and the rise of populism within many countries, including developed countries, have manifested in political and social tensions and divisions.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022 amid such changes, is shaking the very foundations of the international order established after World War II, and the deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian situation since October 2023—particularly the critical humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip—is making divisions within the international community even more complex. Furthermore, the second Trump administration, which was inaugurated in the United States in January

2025, has been advancing policies that prioritize national interests under the banner of “America First,” sending shock waves through the international community.

(Ideal state of a new international order)

In response to the current situation, it has been pointed out in the Committee that the international community stands at a major historical turning point, and that the free and open international order based on the rule of law is facing a grave crisis. Japan, which has followed the path of a peace-loving nation since World War II, is well positioned to play a crucial role in upholding this international order. In particular, the principle upheld by Japan of defending freedom and the rule of law while respecting diversity, inclusiveness, and openness—advocating for non-exclusion, no bloc formation, and not imposing values—is one that could be shared within the international community and become a central pillar of a future international order. Japan should develop its diplomacy based on this principle and promote efforts for the realization of inclusive peace.

In advancing these efforts, it is essential not only to maintain close cooperation with Europe, which shares the values and principles of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, but also to listen to the voices of Global South countries, deepening relationships and strengthening collaboration. Through such engagement, Japan should work to universalize an international order based on defending freedom and the rule of law while respecting diversity, inclusiveness, and openness.

Furthermore, the influence of the United States remains significant in achieving a just ceasefire in the aggression against Ukraine and in maintaining and developing the international order. In addition, the notion that economic interdependence helps prevent war still retains some validity. Building a resilient, multifaceted, and structural economic interdependence that includes the United States is therefore a key element in achieving inclusive peace. At the same time, appropriate responses are also required against economic weaponization. Therefore, Japan should engage in persistent dialogue with the United States, based on a thorough understanding of its position and thinking.

Moreover, while keeping in mind the reality of international politics that cooperation among major powers is indispensable for realizing inclusive peace, Japan should explore strategies to commit countries such as China and Russia to efforts for maintaining and developing the international order, including initiatives related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

(Approach to building a new international order)

In advancing Japan's diplomacy aimed at building a new international order founded on the principle of defending freedom and the rule of law while respecting diversity, inclusiveness, and openness, an approach could be considered of developing multifaceted and multilayered diplomacy by organically linking three layers—bilateral cooperation, partnerships among like-minded nations, and multilateral frameworks—and leveraging the unique characteristics and strengths of each layer. Furthermore, with respect to multilateral frameworks, utilizing multiple frameworks could also prove effective in addressing specific issues.

Given also that the aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundations of the international order and the serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and other developments in the Middle East have further complicated divisions within the international community, and considering the security environment in Asia, initiatives based on pragmatic pacifism with a dual focus on both deterrence and dialogue has become increasingly important. From this perspective, Japan should advance efforts to establish an Asian version of the OSCE as a permanent multilateral security dialogue framework that includes the United States, China, and Russia, where representatives of each country regularly convene to exchange information. Such a mechanism would help accurately discern the intentions of others, even in times of crisis, and prevent conflicts by reducing risks. Through such initiatives, institutionalizing multilateral confidence-building, including between major powers, would contribute to the realization of inclusive peace, not only in Asia, but also across the broader international community.

Furthermore, while the UN (which is at the center of multilateral frameworks)—and in

particular, the Security Council, which bears primary responsibility for international peace and security—has often been raised even within the Committee for its dysfunction, for instance, for not fulfilling its expected role in relation to the aggression against Ukraine, it nonetheless remains a central forum in the international community. As such, efforts should be made for its revitalization as a framework for achieving inclusive peace. In doing so, initiatives should be promoted based on the recognition that “human security” (a key pillar of Japan’s diplomacy) could potentially serve as a principle to unite countries with different values and interests because of its inclusiveness, namely, putting people at the center and ensuring that no one is left behind.

2. Response to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

In its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly engaged in rhetoric and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use nuclear weapons, reigniting fears of nuclear war. Amidst this situation, the international norm that considers the use of nuclear weapons a de facto taboo—a standard cultivated in part through the persistent advocacy and appeals of atomic bomb survivors both domestically and abroad—is now under threat. In addition, the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime—centered on multilateral frameworks such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the bilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control treaty between the United States and Russia—is also on the verge of crisis.

It is precisely because the international environment surrounding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is becoming increasingly severe, Japan—as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war—must take the lead in steadily advancing the international community’s efforts toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, even if only step by step. In the short term, such efforts should include promoting strategic dialogue to maintain the non-use of nuclear weapons, while working to improve crisis management, confidence building, and transparency. And in the medium term, such efforts should include bringing China—which continues to expand its

nuclear arsenal—into a nuclear arms control framework by applying both deterrents and incentives, and exploring a way of nuclear arms control that incorporates multipolarity.

In particular, while the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, it is currently losing traction, as evidenced by the failure to adopt a final document at the last two Review Conferences. In order to reaffirm and strengthen the importance of the NPT regime, it is necessary to strengthen the commitment of nuclear-weapon states to the NPT, including through efforts toward nuclear disarmament, while also addressing potential nuclear-weapon states and demonstrating to developing country members the benefits of remaining within the NPT regime. As part of such efforts, the strengthening of negative security assurances—including making them legally binding—should be considered for discussion at the 11th NPT Review Conference scheduled for 2026.

Furthermore, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which aims to prevent any further increase in the quantity of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile material for such weapons, would be instrumental in enhancing the effectiveness of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks, including the NPT. Japan should further promote efforts towards the early commencement of negotiations on this treaty. At the same time, Japan should also promote parallel efforts, including implementing non-binding measures, such as initiatives aimed at making the production moratorium more universal and increasing transparency, encouragement for the destruction or conversion of facilities producing fissile materials, and requests for the disclosure of stockpile information, and the institutionalization of monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) provides for legal prohibitions against the possession and use of nuclear weapons based on the perspective of the inhumanity of such weapons. Nuclear-weapon states and their allies, including Japan, have not participated in the TPNW, and differences of opinion regarding the security role of nuclear weapons and approaches toward nuclear disarmament remain

between them and the nations that are party to the treaty.

Even within this Committee, some members pointed out that the TPNW is incompatible with Japan-United States security arrangements and argued that Japan should maintain its stance of non-participation to avoid misunderstandings or unrealistic expectations. On the other hand, given that Japan is the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war and that its statements and actions are taken seriously in the international community's efforts toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, other members frequently suggested that Japan should participate as an observer and serve as a bridge between countries with different positions. Taking these points into account, ongoing consideration should be given to how Japan ought to engage with the TPNW.

Furthermore, with regard to victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation as stipulated by the TPNW, regardless of whether or not it becomes a party to the treaty, Japan—with its experience and knowledge as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war—should consider ways in which it can cooperate, and should spearhead international efforts in these areas.

3. Response to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), etc.

Among the international frameworks for disarmament and non-proliferation of conventional weapons, both the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)—which provides for a total ban on the use, stockpiling, and production of anti-personnel landmines—and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)—which prohibits the use, development, and production of cluster munitions—are multilateral frameworks based on a humanitarian disarmament approach that addresses weapons causing unacceptable harm from a humanitarian perspective. Both these treaties are characterized by cooperation and collaboration with civil society and other actors that played an important role in their establishment. On the other hand, they have issues in terms of their universality, how they should be regulated, and how to ensure their effectiveness, as seen by the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions

during the aggression against Ukraine and the use of anti-personnel landmines by non-state actors.

Japan's initiatives for the APMBC in particular represent an area in which the country has achieved significant results. In July 2024, Japan announced its Comprehensive Package of Assistance for Humanitarian Mine Action with a focus of three pillars of support: (1) mine risk education and awareness-raising assistance, (2) mine clearance assistance, and (3) victim assistance. Then at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, along with Japan assuming presidency of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties, the four priority areas for its presidency (December 2024 to December 2025) were announced: (1) strengthening national ownership and capacity building assistance; (2) the application of advanced and emerging technologies in mine action; (3) strengthening the synergies between the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda and mine action; and (4) universalization.

It has also been pointed out in the Committee that it is necessary to review the balance between landmine measures—such as landmine clearance and detection—and victim assistance, as well as the balance of regional distribution. Taking these points into careful consideration, Japan should continue to advance the above-mentioned initiatives.

On the other hand, while promoting the universalization of the APMBC is essential for enhancing its effectiveness, amid heightened security concerns following Russia's aggression against Ukraine and other developments, in March 2025, Poland and the three Baltic states successively announced their intention to withdraw from the Convention, followed by Finland in April 2025. Regarding the CCM, Lithuania, which was the only signatory among these countries, also withdrew from the Convention in March 2025.

Underlying these developments lies the issue of asymmetry in the APMBC and other conventions—an issue that was also raised within the Committee. To this point, in the context of the aggression against Ukraine, since Russia is not a State Party to the APMBC whereas Ukraine is, only Ukraine would be in violation for any use of anti-personnel landmines. This asymmetry led to concerns that other States Parties may

choose to withdraw from the Convention to avoid being placed at a disadvantage in future conflicts. The recent announcements of withdrawal clearly demonstrate that these concerns are becoming a reality. At the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties scheduled for December 2025, debate should be focused on dealing with this asymmetry in relation to the universalization of the Convention and including the consideration of negative security assurances.

4. Response to the Military Use of AI and Regulation of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)

(Military use of AI)

In recent years, with the rapid advancement of AI technologies, international discussion concerning the military use of AI has intensified. It has been pointed out in the Committee that, particularly with progress in the development of generative AI and related technologies, it is expected that many countries will expand the use of AI in decision support systems for military attacks, and that AI holds broad potential for military applications, including target reconnaissance prior to attack decisions, target detection using behavior prediction, and decision support systems in a general sense.

As the use of AI in the military sector becomes a common phenomenon and poses practical challenges, in July 2024, the Ministry of Defense in Japan formulated its Basic Policy on Promoting the Utilization of AI, the first of such policies for the Ministry. On the topic of discussions on international rule-making pertaining to the military use of AI, the policy states that Japan will actively and constructively contribute to international discussions, aiming for the establishment of balanced principles and norms that take into account both humanitarian perspectives and security necessities.

In the discussions of this Committee, the issues of incidental harm to civilians (collateral damage) and the legality review of weapons have been pointed out as challenges under international humanitarian law concerning the military use of AI.

Regarding the issue of incidental harm to civilians, while the occurrence of a certain

degree of collateral damage is anticipated under the principles of distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks as set forth in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, it has been pointed out that the extent of such damage is subject to the discretion of each state and consequently there is a wide margin of interpretation as to whether actual operations satisfy those principles.

Regarding the issue of the legality review of weapons, to ensure the future use of a new weapon does not contravene relevant international law, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I obligates States Parties, when studying, developing, acquiring or adopting a new weapon, to examine in advance whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited. It has been pointed out, however, that since the criteria for such evaluations are not explicitly defined, considering how AI technologies and their applications ought to be examined has become an urgent task.

Taking these points into careful consideration, Japan should take the lead in discussions on international rule-making pertaining to the military use of AI from the perspective of ensuring compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law.

(Regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS))

Regarding the regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), discussions have thus far been conducted under the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, with comments being raised about the military use of AI by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip, the need to reinvigorate discussions aimed at reaching an international consensus on regulating LAWS has been highlighted once again.

It has been pointed out in the Committee that—given that the purpose of LAWS regulation is to legally regulate military powers, and that the most important issue is to prepare a legal instrument for that purpose—even if the level of legal regulation is low, efforts should begin with consensus-building around soft law, and then discussions should proceed towards hard law; and regarding hard law, first a humanitarian law treaty

needs to be established within the CCW framework which is acceptable to military powers, and then that needs to be built on to develop a disarmament treaty.

Taking these points into consideration, Japan should proceed with establishing rules to achieve effective LAWS regulation, doing so in a manner that can secure the participation of major countries, including those that possess the relevant technology and maintain a cautious stance on LAWS regulation.

5. Response to Humanitarianism

In today's international community, armed conflicts—both regional and domestic—have been occurring frequently and becoming increasingly protracted due to various factors such as hostility between states and climate change. These conflicts, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the current humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, have given rise to serious humanitarian issues, such as the killing of civilians and violence against women and children. Numbers of refugees and displaced persons are also on the rise, with the total exceeding 100 million for the first time in 2022. The situation surrounding human security has become increasingly severe, and the need to practice and rebuild humanitarianism and to ensure human dignity has never been higher.

In addressing conflicts and humanitarian crises, in addition to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, peacebuilding and preventing renewed conflict, even in peacetime, are important for realizing an inclusive society. Reflecting this perspective, Japan's Development Cooperation Charter, revised in June 2023, explicitly incorporates the idea of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP Nexus). In cooperation with the international community, Japan is promoting efforts to extend humanitarian assistance, support for poverty reduction and economic development, and assistance for peacebuilding and preventing conflict recurrence. Regarding humanitarian assistance in particular, while the activities of relevant international organizations and non-government organizations (NGOs) play an important role, ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law—which is essential for guaranteeing these activities and

for improving or preventing humanitarian crises—remains a challenge.

In the discussions of this Committee, a number of issues have been raised in relation to these humanitarian assistance activities. These include that, in conflict zones, medical facilities and other sites protected under international humanitarian law are being subjected to attacks, and that while mechanisms such as the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) exist to ensure implementation of international humanitarian law, their responses to violations of the law are extremely weak.

Based on these points, Japan should leverage the trust it has earned through its role as a major donor in development assistance to urge both parties to the conflict to comply with international humanitarian law. In addition, in bilateral and multilateral forums, Japan should actively lead discussions aimed at addressing these challenges and should play a role in coordinating opinions. Japan should also spearhead efforts in the international community to ensure that humanitarian aid is provided impartially and truly based on people's needs.

6. Response to the Impact of Climate Change on Security

The increasing severity and frequency of large-scale natural disasters driven by climate change in recent years—such as torrential rains, floods, droughts, and forest fires—have not only undermined the survival and dignity of those affected, but are a concern as a new security risk. They have heightened insecurity in areas such as food and energy, and have impacted peace and stability, including giving rise to climate refugees. Another emerging security challenge is responses to the prospect of the Arctic Ocean opening as a major navigable route due to melting ice. Furthermore, rising sea levels due to the impact of climate change pose serious consequences—especially for countries surrounded by the ocean, such as Japan and Pacific Island countries—by altering the outer edges of their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), thereby potentially undermining the stability of maritime legal order. For Pacific Island countries in particular, this represents a threat to their very survival.

In response to these new security risks and challenges, it has been pointed out in the Committee that: multilateralism plays an important role in a polarized world facing deep turmoil, such as the proliferation of conflicts, the escalation of emergency situations due to climate change, and the widening of inequality; measures need to be taken to prevent the emergence of many anticipated climate refugees; and in preparation for the Arctic Ocean becoming navigable, efforts must also be made from a security perspective to secure ports, supply bases, and other infrastructure.

Based on these points, Japan should further strengthen its collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with which Japan has shared the concept of the HDP Nexus and has built up cooperative efforts over time. In addition, Japan should further promote activities in the Arctic, such as research and development using the Arctic research vessel Mirai II (currently under construction) as a platform for international research, exploring sustainable utilization of the region, fostering human resources involved in the ocean, and advancing international cooperation in Arctic policy.

Regarding responses to rising sea levels caused by climate change, it has been pointed out in the Committee that: while the approach of fixing baselines is rapidly gaining support as a legal response, caution is warranted from an interpretive perspective given issues related to the exercise of jurisdiction; it is important for Japan to proactively put forward its own interpretive arguments concerning the formation of legal interpretation; and it is important to hold conferences together with Pacific Island countries and others to generate momentum for cooperation on legal responses.

Based on these points, from the perspective that it will also contribute to deepening relations through cooperation and collaboration with Pacific Island countries, which form part of the Global South, Japan should actively pursue diplomatic efforts to promote in the international community an interpretation that allows for the maintenance of territorial sea baselines. In addition, Japan should work towards consensus-building in the international community, including the adoption of interpretative agreement through

a resolution of the UN General Assembly.

7. Response to UN Reform

The UN is the most universal international organization, with membership comprising almost every country in the world. In addition to areas directly related to international peace, such as conflict resolution, peacebuilding, counterterrorism, and disarmament and non-proliferation, the UN is engaged in issues across diverse fields, including poverty and development, human rights, refugee issues, the environment and climate change, disaster prevention, and health. Within the UN, the Security Council bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It is the only UN body that can make decisions that are legally binding on all member states. The Security Council comprises five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. Drawing on the lesson learned from the League of Nations that the effectiveness of collective security cannot be guaranteed without the participation and concerted action of the major powers, a mechanism of so-called veto power by permanent members is in place.

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, a draft resolution that deplores the aggression by Russia and calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops was put to a vote in the Security Council. However, it was not adopted as Russia exercised its veto. Subsequently, in March 2022, an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly was convened under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, during which the resolution titled "Aggression against Ukraine" was adopted. Since then, successive resolutions concerning the aggression against Ukraine have been adopted by the General Assembly.

Against the backdrop of this dysfunction of the Security Council, there is growing recognition within the international community that reform of the Security Council should be realized promptly to make the body more legitimate, effective, and representative. At the Summit of the Future, held at the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the outcome document *Pact for the Future* was adopted, which, for the

first time, referred to the “urgent” need for Security Council reform, becoming the first concrete outcome document on Security Council reform at the heads-of-state level.

It has been pointed out in the Committee that: it is important for Japan to be able to participate in deliberations of the Security Council and to be involved in negotiations as long as possible, and rather than continuing to pursue the difficult goal of a permanent seat, Japan should pursue reform to establish a new category of “semi-permanent members,” with no veto power and with longer-term, re-electable seats; and, while abolishing veto power would be extremely difficult, it is worth trying to create a system whereby the veto cannot be exercised unless opposed by two permanent members.

Taking these points into consideration, from the perspective that strengthening multilateralism—with the UN at its center—is necessary for reinforcing and promoting the rule of law in the international order and for realizing inclusive peace, in order to achieve concrete results promptly, Japan should actively work toward realizing Security Council reform by building momentum for such reform in collaboration with Global South countries, including African countries, and other relevant countries.

Recognizing the importance of revitalizing multilateralism, including the UN, this Committee has spent the past three years exploring the ideal form of the future international order from various angles. However, during this period, the international community has faced extremely severe realities. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been an ongoing, grave challenge to the existing international order and an ongoing serious threat to international peace and security. At the same time, the situation in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Palestinian situation, has become increasingly unstable, and the Gaza Strip in particular continues to experience a severe humanitarian crisis. Divisions in the international community over how to respond to these situations have also grown more complicated.

Amid this reality of the international community, Japan must continue to squarely

address the complex and serious challenges of war and peace, and must continue to seek ways to resolve these challenges. In advancing such efforts, these recommendations, along with what was presented in the discussions of this Committee—such as the ideal state of a new international order, approaches for building this international order, and responses to policy issues including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation—could serve as one of the guiding references for determining what role Japan should play in the international community moving forward.

Having followed the path of a peace-loving nation since World War II, Japan is expected to take the lead in realizing inclusive peace within the international community—especially in this era of great difficulty—drawing upon its historical experience. It is the earnest hope of this Committee that these recommendations will help Japan demonstrate its “capacity for resolution” to the challenges faced.

Reference 1 Timeline of Deliberations

(First Year)

Diet session and date	Outline
<p>210th (Extraordinary session)</p> <p>October 3, 2022</p> <p>December 10</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of the Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security at a plenary meeting • Election of the Committee Chair (INOUCHI Kuniko (LDP)) • Election of Directors • Decision on this three-year term's research theme: "War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order"
<p>211th (Ordinary session)</p> <p>February 8, 2023</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session ("War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order" focusing on Requirements for the Prevention of War) <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>ASADA Masahiko</p> <p>Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University</p> <p>UETA Takako</p> <p>Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Kagawa University</p> <p>Lecturer, Graduate School, Sophia University</p> <p>KODA Yoji</p> <p>Former Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet, Japan</p>

	<p>Maritime Self-Defense Force</p> <p>February 15 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #1 (NPT, CTBT, FMCT, INF, New START))</p> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>SANO Toshio</p> <p>Acting Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission</p> <p>Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament</p> <p>TOSAKI Hirofumi</p> <p>Director, Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology, the Japan Institute of International Affairs</p> <p>SUZUKI Tatsujiro</p> <p>Vice Director and Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University</p>
<p>February 22</p>	<p>• Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation #2 (Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Personnel Landmines, Cluster Bombs, etc.))</p> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p>

	<p>HABA Kumiko</p> <p>Emeritus Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University</p> <p>Specially Appointed Professor, Kanagawa University</p> <p>DOI Kanae</p> <p>Japan Director, Human Rights Watch</p> <p>MEKATA Motoko</p> <p>Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University</p>
April 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on UN Reform (Security Council Reform and Strengthening of Specialized Agencies)) <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>KITAOKA Shinichi</p> <p>Emeritus Professor, The University of Tokyo</p> <p>AKASHI Yasushi</p> <p>Chairman of the Board, Kyoto International Conference Center</p> <p>YOSHIKAWA Motohide</p> <p>Distinguished Professor, International Christian University</p> <p>Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations</p>
April 26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New

	<p>International Order” focusing on Developing Sustainable Defense Bases)</p> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>MIYAGAWA Makio</p> <p>Former Special Advisor on National Security, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat</p> <p>Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Malaysia</p> <p>MORIMOTO Satoshi</p> <p>Advisor, Takushoku University</p> <p>NISHIYAMA Junichi</p> <p>Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Future Engineering</p>
May 17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange of views among Committee members (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order”)
June 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision on the research report and its submission to the President of the House of Councillors • Decision to offer the report at a plenary meeting

(Second Year)

Diet session and date	Outline
212th (Extraordinary session) December 13, 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election of directors to fill vacancies
213th (Ordinary session) February 7, 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election of a director to fill a vacancy • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Efforts and Challenges in International Rule-Making on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and Ensuring Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)) <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>OGASAWARA Ichiro</p> <p>Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament</p> <p>IWAMOTO Seigo</p> <p>Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law Director, Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University</p> <p>SHIMIZU Toshihiro</p> <p>Executive Director, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines</p>
February 14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for

	<p>Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Armed Conflicts, etc. and Efforts and Challenges towards Practicing and Rebuilding Humanitarianism)</p> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>HANZAWA Shoko</p> <p>Head of Delegation in Japan, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</p> <p>MURATA Shinjiro</p> <p>General Director, Médecins Sans Frontières Japan</p> <p>MATSUI Yoshiro</p> <p>Emeritus Professor, Nagoya University</p>
February 21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Efforts and Challenges in Starting Negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)) <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>AKIYAMA Nobumasa</p> <p>Professor, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University</p> <p>ABE Tatsuya</p> <p>Professor, School of International Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University</p> <p>KAWASAKI Akira</p> <p>Executive Committee Member, Peace Boat</p>

- April 17 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Efforts and Challenges in Ensuring International Food and Energy Security and Human Security, etc., in View of the Impact of Climate Change and Armed Conflicts, etc.)

(Voluntary testifiers)

KAMEYAMA Yasuko

Professor, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, The University of Tokyo

AKIMOTO Kazumine

Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Institute, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation

HADZIALIC Hideko

Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Representation Office in Tokyo

- May 15 • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Measures and Efforts to Address the Impacts of Climate Change on Maritime Legal Order)

(Voluntary testifiers)

HARADA Naomi

Professor, Atmosphere and Ocean Research Institute, The University of Tokyo

	<p>HONDA Yusuke</p> <p>Associate Professor, Graduate School of Maritime Sciences, Kobe University</p> <p>SHIOZAWA Hideyuki</p> <p>Senior Program Officer, Pacific Island Nations Program Team, Ocean Policy Research Institute, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation</p>
May 22	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange of views among Committee members (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order”)
June 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision on the research report and its submission to the President of the House of Councillors • Decision to offer the report at a plenary meeting

(Third Year)

Diet session and date	Outline
214th (Extraordinary session) October 9, 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election of a director to fill a vacancy
215th (Special session) November 14, 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resignation of a director and election of directors to fill vacancies
216th (Extraordinary session) December 24, 2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election of a director to fill a vacancy
217th (Ordinary session) February 12, 2025	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Current State and Issues Surrounding the Situation in the Middle East) (Voluntary testifiers) TATEYAMA Ryoji Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy of Japan SATO Heigo Professor, Takushoku University OCHI Megumi Associate Professor, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University
February 19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New

	<p>International Order” focusing on Current State and Issues Surrounding the War in Ukraine)</p> <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>HIROSE Yoshikazu</p> <p>Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Defense Academy of Japan</p> <p>KOIZUMI Yu</p> <p>Associate Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo</p> <p>SAKAI Hironobu</p> <p>Professor, Faculty of Law, Waseda University</p>
February 26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hearing opinions of voluntary testifiers and conducting a question and answer session (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century: Building a New International Order” focusing on Challenges and Approaches toward Achieving Inclusive Peace) <p>(Voluntary testifiers)</p> <p>HOSOYA Yuichi</p> <p>Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University</p> <p>SAGARA Yoshiyuki</p> <p>Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics, International House of Japan</p> <p>ICHIHARA Maiko</p> <p>Professor, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University</p>
April 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange of views among Committee members (“War, Peace, and Capacity for Resolution in the 21st Century:

	Building a New International Order”)
June 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision on the research report and its submission to the President of the House of Councillors • Decision to offer the report at a plenary meeting

Reference 2

List of Committee Members

Chair	INOUCHI Kuniko (LDP)
Director	ASAHI Kentaro (LDP)
Director	OCHI Toshiyuki (LDP)
Director	YOSHIKAWA Yumi (LDP)
Director	TAKAGI Mari (CDP)
Director	TAKAHASHI Mitsuo (KP)
Director	KUSHIDA Seiichi (JIP)
Director	HAMAGUCHI Makoto (DPFP-SR)
Director	IWABUCHI Tomo (JCP)
	AKAMATSU Ken (LDP)
	IKUINA Akiko (LDP)
	UENO Michiko (LDP)
	KOYARI Takashi (LDP)
	NAGAI Manabu (LDP)
	HIGA Natsumi (LDP)
	MATSUKAWA Rui (LDP)
	MORI Masako (LDP)
	KOGA Yukihiro (CDP)
	SHIOMURA Ayaka (CDP)
	SUGIO Hideya (CDP)
	HIROTA Hajime (CDP)
	SHIOTA Hiroaki (KP)
	INOSE Naoki (JIP)
	IHA Yoichi (OW)
	SAITO Kenichiro (NHK Party)

Note:	LDP:	Liberal Democratic Party
	CDP:	The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Social Democratic Party and the Independent
	KP:	Komeito
	JIP:	Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party)
	DPFP-SR:	Democratic Party For the People and The Shin-Ryokufukai
	JCP:	Japanese Communist Party
	OW:	Okinawa Whirlwind
	NHK Party:	The Party to Protect People from NHK

First Special Research Office

Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security
House of Councillors

House of Councillors #2 Annex

1-11-16 Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0014, Japan

Tel: 81-3-3581-3111 Ext. 75401

Direct line: 81-3-5521-7659

Fax: 81-3-5512-3915